A stack of security advisories with exploited flaws highlighted A stack of security advisories with exploited flaws highlighted

Fall 2026 security roundup: record patch counts and AI-found bugs

TL;DR The story of the last three months is volume. Microsoft’s October Patch Tuesday fixed a record 1,411 flaws, and that’s not counting the 348 fixed earlier in the month. The worst exploited bugs were the usual suspects: edge devices. Citrix NetScaler had two zero-days exploited for weeks before the September 27 patch. Browsers and phones got exploited bugs too: Chrome CVE-2026-87491 (the seventh Chrome zero-day this year) and Apple CVE-2026-86950. A Shai-Hulud-style npm worm got valid provenance signatures by releasing through the victim maintainer’s own CI, and parked persistence in .vscode and .claude directories. AI is on both sides now. It’s finding bugs faster than maintainers can patch them, and AI coding agents are themselves a target. Why I keep a list like this I run a homelab with a public blog, a k3s cluster, a pile of self-hosted apps and a coding agent with a shell. Every category below has a version that applies to me. This roundup is the list I worked through for my own stuff, cleaned up. It’s dated: everything here is as of late October 2026. ...

October 31, 2026 · 7 min · zolty
A self-hosted share host acting as a data-sharing layer A self-hosted share host acting as a data-sharing layer

My Share Host Became a Data Layer: ACLs, Forms, Comments, Status Pages

TL;DR I built a self-hosted share host in early September because a Claude artifact link was private to me and I needed to hand a page to specific people who have no account on anything I run. Access control was the first feature, not an afterthought. Authentication and authorization are split on purpose. oauth2-proxy with Google proves who you are and authorizes nothing. A small FastAPI app reads a per-folder ACL object from the bucket and decides what you can open. Grants change in about 15 seconds with no deploy. Pages that take input don’t post to a database. Every checkbox and typed cell becomes a typed operation that lands as a merge commit on a JSON spec in GitLab, authored by the person who made it. Git is the config layer. Every page has a comment rail. Comments have changed real work: a gear list, and the status page for my blue-team security harness. Long-running jobs get a status page that rebuilds itself from the job’s own data. The security eval ran on one across three days. A restore job I was babysitting republished every three minutes from a systemd timer. Access control came first The problem was boring and specific. I make a lot of HTML with Claude: plans, reports, checklists. When I built this, an artifact link was mine alone. There was no way to say “this person can open it and nobody else.” Emailing HTML files around is how you end up with four versions of the same checklist. ...

October 29, 2026 · 9 min · zolty
Security model evaluation results Security model evaluation results

Grading Seven AI Models on Blue-Team Security Work in a VM With No Network Card

TL;DR I wanted to know which models I can trust for the defensive side of running a homelab: reviewing code for vulnerabilities, reviewing Kubernetes and Terraform config, triaging logs, and reading threat intel without making things up. So I built a harness with 112 frozen synthetic cases, graded everything deterministically (no LLM judge), and ran every model-written fix inside a Proxmox VM whose network card was deleted at the hypervisor. ...

October 12, 2026 · 16 min · zolty
A modelled repair queue with tickets, parts, and labour A modelled repair queue with tickets, parts, and labour

The repair queue is four states and a no-go rule

TL;DR An unmodelled repair backlog becomes a pile of dusty things you feel bad about. Ask me how I know. Four ticket states: open, blocked, done, abandoned. blocked and abandoned are the two that do the work. abandoned is a feature. A queue you can’t quit is a queue that grows forever, and “I’ll get to it” is not a state. Parts are modelled as purchases and uses separately, because you buy a bag of ten capacitors and use two. Otherwise your cost-per-repair is nonsense. Labour gets logged per worker with an hourly rate, and that number flows all the way back into what I’m willing to bid on a lot. The no-go rule does more for profitability than any repair skill I have: if parts and time exceed roughly 60% of realistic resale, or resale is under about $120, it doesn’t get a ticket. Other people work this queue. Four access roles keep them on inventory and tickets and away from anything financial. Why a pile forms Buying surplus means buying broken things, on purpose, because broken is cheap and some broken things are trivially fixable. A cassette deck with a perished belt is a $4 part and twenty minutes. A workstation that won’t POST is often one reseated stick of RAM. ...

August 25, 2026 · 10 min · zolty
Fetching secrets into CI without leaking them Fetching secrets into CI without leaking them

Secrets without leaks: a Bitwarden CLI into CI and agent permissions

TL;DR Secrets leak through echo, debug tracing, logs, process args, and env-var inheritance — guard the flow, not just storage Fetch from Bitwarden once, assign to a shell variable, reference the variable — never inline the raw value Verify with first-3/last-3: ${VAR:0:3}...${VAR: -3} — confirm you have the right token without exposing it GitLab masked vars hide values in logs (8+ chars); protected vars only expose on protected branches — use both for production secrets Agent permission rules prefer command substitution inside the allowed command, not as an env var Rotate tokens immediately; verify before use; pin your bw CLI version The leak surface — where secrets escape I used to think storing secrets in Bitwarden (or Vault, HashiCorp, whatever) meant they were safe. I was wrong. ...

August 4, 2026 · 8 min · zolty
Traefik forward-auth middleware fronting homelab services with Authentik SSO Traefik forward-auth middleware fronting homelab services with Authentik SSO

Every homelab service behind one login: Traefik forward-auth with Authentik

TL;DR Every service I run — ComfyUI, Grafana, Vault, even the ancient app on a Mac across the network — lives behind a Traefik forward-auth middleware that hands off to Authentik. No per-service login page. One Authentik login shared across everything. The magic is a two-route IngressRoute pattern: a protected route with the middleware + an unprotected callback route for the OAuth flow itself. Adding a new service to the cluster takes five lines of YAML. Wiring a non-Kubernetes backend — like the Mac that runs ComfyUI and Ollama — takes a service-with-manual-endpoints proxy. ...

June 7, 2026 · 7 min · zolty
Vault HA cluster fronted by Authentik with KMS auto-unseal Vault HA cluster fronted by Authentik with KMS auto-unseal

HashiCorp Vault behind Authentik — secrets that survive an auditor

TL;DR I had Authentik handling human auth and kubeseal handling cluster secrets, which left a gap: anything that needed a real secret at runtime — API tokens, database passwords, Bedrock keys — was one kubectl get secret away from being readable in plaintext. I deployed HashiCorp Vault as a 3-node HA cluster on k3s, auto-unsealed via AWS KMS, with Authentik OIDC for human SSO and the Kubernetes auth method for workloads. Apps get their secrets injected by a sidecar; no app code touches a k8s Secret object anymore. The migration took a weekend and removed an entire category of “what if this got read” worry I’d been ignoring. ...

May 17, 2026 · 8 min · zolty
Hardening OpenClaw container security Hardening OpenClaw container security

Hardening a Self-Hosted AI Agent: Multi-Stage Builds, NetworkPolicies, and Automated CVE Triage

TL;DR OpenClaw, my self-hosted AI trading agent, was running in a fat container with 46 Critical CVEs, no network restrictions, and no automated vulnerability scanning. I fixed all three: multi-stage Dockerfile dropped the CVE count to single digits, default-deny NetworkPolicies locked down traffic, and a daily CronJob triages Trivy scan results via local LLM and posts a digest to Slack. Total cost of the automated triage: $0/day. The problem with AI agent containers AI agent containers are uniquely bad from a security perspective. They need: ...

April 9, 2026 · 7 min · zolty
Week of March 23 retrospective Week of March 23 retrospective

Week of March 23: Security Patches, AI Tooling, and Defending the Homelab on Reddit

TL;DR Busy week. Three CVE patches shipped on the same day. OpenClaw stabilized with OpenRouter support and a cost exporter. The Wiki.js fork with Mermaid 11 went live after clearing a Trivy scan. PiKey — a Raspberry Pi that pretends to be a Bluetooth keyboard — shipped as a side project. A self-hosted GitHub Actions cache server cut CI restore times from minutes to seconds. And a Reddit comment defending “I use Claude to manage my infrastructure” turned into five new blog posts and a documentation sprint. ...

March 29, 2026 · 6 min · zolty
Wiki.js fork with Mermaid 11 Wiki.js fork with Mermaid 11

Forking Wiki.js to Get Mermaid 11: When Upstream Won't Move

TL;DR Wiki.js 2.x ships Mermaid 8.8.2, released in 2020. Mermaid 11 — the current stable release — adds timeline diagrams, improved gitGraph, better theming, and fixes years of rendering bugs. The upstream project defers this upgrade to Wiki.js v3, which has no release date. The PR queue has sat idle for over a year. I forked requarks/wiki at tag v2.5.312, upgraded Mermaid in-place, patched 8 CVEs including one Critical SAML authentication bypass, reduced the vulnerability count from 8 Critical / 48 High to 3 Critical / 42 High, and deployed it to the cluster. The fork stays close to upstream — Vue 2 and Webpack 4 are untouched. Only the Mermaid surface and security dependencies are modified. ...

March 29, 2026 · 5 min · zolty

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