A permission classifier sitting between an AI agent and a shell A permission classifier sitting between an AI agent and a shell

Claude Code's auto mode denied me 301 times in seven weeks

TL;DR Claude Code’s auto permission mode puts a classifier between the agent and any tool call that is not already covered by an allow rule. I ran in that mode all summer. In the transcripts I still have (mid-August to early October), 301 tool results mention that classifier. About 288 are outright denials, about ten are “no verdict” errors, and a few just quote the phrase. Of roughly 57,700 tool calls in September, that is about 0.5%. Almost all of it landed in September (285 of the 301), and it peaked on September 6 with 29 in one day. Two things helped: adding environment text that tells the classifier what my infrastructure is, and adding narrow allow rules so routine commands never reach it. Neither one was a clean win, and I will show where the data does and does not support that. Sometime between late September and early October I switched the default mode to bypass. The thing that makes that tolerable is a deterministic hook that runs before permission rules in every mode. The classifier was not wrong often. It was expensive in attention, and it was the wrong tool for unattended work. This is part of a small batch about the classifiers I run around agents. The rewrite of my destructive-command guard came first, and a field guide to all of them will follow. ...

October 10, 2026 · 11 min · zolty
A shell command being parsed into argv before a guard decides whether to block it A shell command being parsed into argv before a guard decides whether to block it

Rewriting my agent's destructive-command guard to parse, not grep

TL;DR I run a PreToolUse hook that blocks a short list of unrecoverable shell commands before my coding agent can run them. Version 1 was a list of regular expressions over the raw command string. Replaying 90 historical blocks and about 82,000 historical commands showed that roughly 40% of v1’s blocks were not commands at all. They were grep patterns, commit messages, and markdown heredocs that happened to contain a scary phrase. v2 tokenizes the command the way a shell would and applies each rule only where a program actually runs. On the same replay it allowed every false text match, still caught every real destructive command v1 caught, caught a few that v1 missed because of flag order, threw zero parser errors, and took about 51 ms per call end to end. It fails toward blocking. If it cannot parse something it falls back to text rules, and if Python is missing the shell wrapper falls back to the old regex list. It is a tripwire for an agent that makes mistakes, not a security boundary against one that is trying to hide. I show a case it does not catch below. I will write up my experience with Claude Code’s auto-mode classifier separately. The short version is that this hook, not the classifier, is what stands between the agent and my cluster’s worst commands. ...

October 3, 2026 · 11 min · zolty

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