A stack of security advisories with exploited flaws highlighted A stack of security advisories with exploited flaws highlighted

Fall 2026 security roundup: record patch counts and AI-found bugs

TL;DR The story of the last three months is volume. Microsoft’s October Patch Tuesday fixed a record 1,411 flaws, and that’s not counting the 348 fixed earlier in the month. The worst exploited bugs were the usual suspects: edge devices. Citrix NetScaler had two zero-days exploited for weeks before the September 27 patch. Browsers and phones got exploited bugs too: Chrome CVE-2026-87491 (the seventh Chrome zero-day this year) and Apple CVE-2026-86950. A Shai-Hulud-style npm worm got valid provenance signatures by releasing through the victim maintainer’s own CI, and parked persistence in .vscode and .claude directories. AI is on both sides now. It’s finding bugs faster than maintainers can patch them, and AI coding agents are themselves a target. Why I keep a list like this I run a homelab with a public blog, a k3s cluster, a pile of self-hosted apps and a coding agent with a shell. Every category below has a version that applies to me. This roundup is the list I worked through for my own stuff, cleaned up. It’s dated: everything here is as of late October 2026. ...

October 31, 2026 · 7 min · zolty
A single overloaded worker node among healthy ones A single overloaded worker node among healthy ones

One k3s node, four months of CPU starvation, three false fixes

TL;DR One worker in my home k3s cluster, k3s-agent-4, has been starved for CPU on and off since 2026-06-13. I’ve written about it in my cluster knowledge base more than a dozen times. It was declared fixed at least once and the declaration was falsified twice. “Quiet for a few weeks” turned out to be temporary. What the node showed: requests at 87 percent, limits at 629 percent of CPU, probes timing out, and Longhorn’s engine-image pod restarting hundreds of times. The alert I’d written for this could not fire on a node starved enough to silence its own exporter. Replacing it was the most useful change of the whole saga. The latest and most promising finding is physical: the Proxmox host under that VM clamps its CPU to 800 MHz under load (BD PROCHOT). As of early October that is open, not fixed. This is a post about the shape of a chronic problem, and how many plausible explanations can be true at once. The cluster in one paragraph The home cluster is four Proxmox hosts running k3s VMs: a control plane and four workers, with Longhorn for storage. (It used to have three control planes, until I collapsed it to one on 2026-09-05.) Workers have 6 to 10 vCPU each. The worker in this story lives on the fourth host, the only one with hyperthreading: an i7 with six physical cores and twelve threads, hosting the 10-vCPU agent. ...

October 26, 2026 · 10 min · zolty
A set of classifiers each routing decisions toward allow, deny or a human A set of classifiers each routing decisions toward allow, deny or a human

A field guide to the classifiers in my stack

TL;DR I count six classifiers in my daily stack. Only three of them involve a model. The other three are keyword lists and parsers, and they are the ones I trust more. The useful question for any classifier is not “how accurate is it” but “which way does it fail?” Every one of mine fails toward a human, or toward the cautious side, on purpose. Four principles I keep relearning: deterministic checks first, fail toward a human, a classifier may only tighten, and measure against a golden set instead of vibes. The most common classifier bug in my setup was classifying text instead of the thing the text describes. Measurement is uneven. I have real numbers for some of these and none for others, and I have tried to say which is which. Why a field guide I did not set out to build a classifier collection. They accumulated, one incident at a time, each time something needed to decide “is this one of those” before an action happened. Resale is the hobby that funds the hobby, and a lot of the automation around it is the same question asked in different places: should this thing be allowed to proceed? ...

October 22, 2026 · 10 min · zolty
A permission classifier sitting between an AI agent and a shell A permission classifier sitting between an AI agent and a shell

Claude Code's auto mode denied me 301 times in seven weeks

TL;DR Claude Code’s auto permission mode puts a classifier between the agent and any tool call that is not already covered by an allow rule. I ran in that mode all summer. In the transcripts I still have (mid-August to early October), 301 tool results mention that classifier. About 288 are outright denials, about ten are “no verdict” errors, and a few just quote the phrase. Of roughly 57,700 tool calls in September, that is about 0.5%. Almost all of it landed in September (285 of the 301), and it peaked on September 6 with 29 in one day. Two things helped: adding environment text that tells the classifier what my infrastructure is, and adding narrow allow rules so routine commands never reach it. Neither one was a clean win, and I will show where the data does and does not support that. Sometime between late September and early October I switched the default mode to bypass. The thing that makes that tolerable is a deterministic hook that runs before permission rules in every mode. The classifier was not wrong often. It was expensive in attention, and it was the wrong tool for unattended work. This is part of a small batch about the classifiers I run around agents. The rewrite of my destructive-command guard came first, and a field guide to all of them will follow. ...

October 10, 2026 · 11 min · zolty
A CI gate matching a test change against an exact fingerprint A CI gate matching a test change against an exact fingerprint

Never delete tests to get green: exact-fingerprint exceptions

TL;DR In July I wrote about a test-deletion sentinel: CI hard-fails if a merge request deletes tests, unless the commit message carries a [test-refactor] tag and an issue number. I was pleased with it. It turns out a tag in a commit message is a bypass that an agent (or I, on a bad day) can write in one line, and it excused every test change in the MR, not just the one I meant. ...

October 7, 2026 · 8 min · zolty
A shell command being parsed into argv before a guard decides whether to block it A shell command being parsed into argv before a guard decides whether to block it

Rewriting my agent's destructive-command guard to parse, not grep

TL;DR I run a PreToolUse hook that blocks a short list of unrecoverable shell commands before my coding agent can run them. Version 1 was a list of regular expressions over the raw command string. Replaying 90 historical blocks and about 82,000 historical commands showed that roughly 40% of v1’s blocks were not commands at all. They were grep patterns, commit messages, and markdown heredocs that happened to contain a scary phrase. v2 tokenizes the command the way a shell would and applies each rule only where a program actually runs. On the same replay it allowed every false text match, still caught every real destructive command v1 caught, caught a few that v1 missed because of flag order, threw zero parser errors, and took about 51 ms per call end to end. It fails toward blocking. If it cannot parse something it falls back to text rules, and if Python is missing the shell wrapper falls back to the old regex list. It is a tripwire for an agent that makes mistakes, not a security boundary against one that is trying to hide. I show a case it does not catch below. I will write up my experience with Claude Code’s auto-mode classifier separately. The short version is that this hook, not the classifier, is what stands between the agent and my cluster’s worst commands. ...

October 3, 2026 · 11 min · zolty
Debugging quiet failures on a fleet of desktop machines used as cluster nodes Debugging quiet failures on a fleet of desktop machines used as cluster nodes

Six ways my surplus all-in-one k3s nodes failed quietly

TL;DR I joined eight surplus all-in-ones to my office k3s cluster as workers (the build is in the previous post). Six things went wrong, and all six failed quietly. A scheduling taint left 96 cores running zero workload pods while three small VMs ran 66. Prose inside a YAML folded scalar became k3s command-line arguments, and k3s silently dropped every flag after it. A DHCP lease and a pinned node IP disagreed. The login greeter suspended WiFi-only machines after 20 minutes. One mokutil command broke TPM auto-unlock. A weekly patch play skipped its own job for weeks. The common fix is boring: read back what the system actually did and assert on that, not on the exit code. 1. The taint that idled the fleet My original plan, from a proposal doc, was to taint the panels so nothing but the kiosk would run on them. What shipped was a softer version, PreferNoSchedule, because I also wanted Longhorn on the panels, and Longhorn’s DaemonSets would be locked out by a hard taint. Changing Longhorn’s toleration setting needs every volume detached, which means downtime just to satisfy a taint. ...

September 18, 2026 · 8 min · zolty
All-in-one desk screens rotating through an operations dashboard All-in-one desk screens rotating through an operations dashboard

An ops board on surplus all-in-ones that double as desks

TL;DR The screens on eight surplus all-in-ones show an ops board: bids, ship queue, pickups, repair backlog, cluster health, weather and traffic. They sit on desks around the office and do double duty: a workstation when someone sits down, the board the rest of the time. The same machines are on their way to becoming k3s worker nodes (one has joined so far), and that build gets its own post. It’s one static HTML page in Chrome kiosk mode. No framework server, no Kubernetes workload. Ansible deploys it. 15 scenes sit in a weighted registry and rotate off the wall clock, about 34 seconds each, so eight screens agree without talking to each other. When a fetch fails the page keeps the last good data and shows its age. A board with stale data and a warning beats a blank screen. It’s a different animal from my older home signage system, which is a k8s app with Raspberry Pi kiosks. One real thing it did: on 2026-09-06 the home cluster’s daily Longhorn backup had stopped completing, and the board’s home-cluster card showed the critical alert. Not the same project as the home signage I’ve written about digital signage on k3s before: an Angular app, a handful of Flask services, MQTT, Raspberry Pis driving displays. That’s a proper application and it lives in the home cluster. ...

September 11, 2026 · 7 min · zolty
A bloated instruction file being trimmed down to a short entry point A bloated instruction file being trimmed down to a short entry point

Putting my CLAUDE.md on a diet: 19 KB down to 7.6 KB

TL;DR On September 6 I audited every file Claude Code loads at the start of a session on my main machine. The global CLAUDE.md went from 19,286 bytes to 7,607 (down 60.6%). The four biggest project memory indexes went from 64,900 bytes combined to 6,513 (down 90.0%). The file had more than doubled in under three months. A backup from June 18 was 9,242 bytes. Every addition had seemed reasonable when I made it. The biggest single category of cuts was model information: release lists, retirement dates, introductory pricing, spend estimates. I replaced all of it with a rule, “use only the models and efforts the active CLI offers”, and kept the judgment about which tier fits which task. The honest caveat: this is a document check. I verified that files parse, links resolve, and the constraints I care about survived. I did not benchmark whether Claude behaves better or worse, and I did not take a token count from a live session. Bytes are not tokens. If you have read my earlier post on re-tuning my setup for a new model, this is the sequel with a different lesson. That time I learned not to trust a model’s suggestions about what to delete. This time I put a validator and a rollback around the edits. ...

September 8, 2026 · 9 min · zolty
A checklist-driven auditor catching defects in a supervisor's review A checklist-driven auditor catching defects in a supervisor's review

The cheaper model audited the expensive one and found two bugs

TL;DR On July 31 a fleet of long-running Claude manager sessions that I was using to supervise parallel work collapsed badly enough that I had to cold-start the whole thing. My first hypothesis was that the supervisor model was not smart enough. That hypothesis was checkable, and false. The transcripts showed the managers really were running Opus 5. They still failed. The dominant failure markers in their ledgers were stale and duplicate, which are bookkeeping problems that a script gets right every time and a model gets right most of the time. The same week, a Sonnet auditor at medium effort, given an explicit list of gates to check, found two real defects that the Opus supervisor had missed. The Opus supervisor was better at something else: writing the gate list and noticing what was not on it. I turned that into a table that allocates model and effort per type of turn, with scripts doing the work that is decidable. I am going to be careful about how much that one afternoon proves, which is not much. It is one observation, and I did not run a benchmark. I wrote earlier about sending finished code to a rival model for review. This is the same instinct from the other direction: reviewer and author should not share a blind spot, but they also do not need to share a price tier. ...

September 4, 2026 · 9 min · zolty

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